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COMMENT
ANTITRUST AND THE CONSUMER INTEREST:
CAN SECTION 4 OF THE CLAYTON ACT
SURVIVE THE CURRENT SUPREME COURT?
INTRODUCTION
The antitrust laws are designed and, to some extent, function to
protect free enterprise and the benefits deemed to attend that system of
allocating resources available to the nation's economy. According to the
proponents of antitrust regulation, the chief evils from which free enter-
prise requires protection are the anti-competitive efforts of actual and
potential monopolists to strangle the free enterprise mechanism and to
prevent or inhibit realization of its goals.' While the primary responsibili-
ty for enforcement of the federal antitrust laws rests with government
agencies, the availability of remedies to private parties injured by their
violation has traditionally been recognized as a necessary supplement to
government enforcement.' Additionally, Congress has demonstrated its
belief that consumers have important rights in the antitrust context by
enacting legislation authorizing state attorneys general to seek treble
damages under a parens patriae theory for injuries suffered by citizens
of their states.3 As a supplement to the enforcement efforts of the
several government agencies with jurisdiction over antitrust matters, the
private treble damage action helps to prevent the adulteration and even-
tual disintegration of our free enterprise system.
This comment will survey the main tools available to the consumer and
his representative and assess their effectiveness in attaining the dual
goals of compensation and deterrence. Specifically, it will examine the
remedies provided by section 4 of the Clayton Act4 and their application
through the Rule 235 class action and parens patiae devices. Finally, the
1. See A. AUSTIN, ANTITRUST: LAW, ECONOMICS, POLICY §§ 2.1, 12.8 (1976).
2. See, e.g., Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v. New Jersey Wood Finishing Co., 381
U.S. 311, 318-26 (1965).
3. Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, tit. III, 15 U.S.C. §§ 15(c)-(h) (amending
Clayton Antitrust Act § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970)).
4. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970).
5. FED. R. CIV. P. 23.
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potential of the Supreme Court's recent decision in Illinois Brick Co. v.
Illinois6 for leaving many consumers with no remedy at all will be
scrutinized.
I. THE ORIGINS OF THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAWS
Until the Civil War, the industrial growth of the United States had
been relatively slow. Particularly in the South, agriculture dominated
export trade. In part, the conflict between the increasingly industrialized
northern states and the agricultural South provided the economic, if not
moral, basis for the war.7 Having won the war, northern industry under-
took the task of winning the West.
Western migration and development of the railroads leapfrogged at an
astounding pace. 8 As the settlements west of the Mississippi River were
established, they became markets for the industries of the Northeast.
The railroads served as vast conveyor belts, transporting equipment and
other manufactured goods westward and agricultural produce eastward.
Huge fortunes were amassed by businessmen, and by the builders and
operators of the railroads. Federal land grants, designed to encourage
and facilitate the westward migration, supplied railroads and settlers
with millions of acres of land. 9 By the last decade of the nineteenth
century the United States had become the world's foremost industrial
nation, and the frontier within the continental United States had disap-
peared.10
America's success was reflected in the empires of the Goulds, Rocke-
fellers, Carnegies, and Morgans. For most of the United States, howev-
er, the meteoric rise of their nation was more apt to spell depression,
ruin, and poverty. As Professor Limbaugh wrote in his study of the
origins of antitrust legislation, "Farmers, traders, laborers, individual
business proprietors and small business enterprises were frequently ren-
dered helpless and often disappeared in the fierce wars of the leviathans
of the new order for the control of the railroads, industries and finance of
the country."" Men of great vision and ability were overcome by the
6. 431 U.S. 720 (1977).
7. See C. BEARD, THE RISE OF AMERICAN CIVILIZATION 635-40, 663-724 (1930).
8. "With a stride that astounded statisticians the conquering hosts of business enter-
prise swept over the continent; twenty-five years after the death of Lincoln, America had
become, in the quantity and value of her products, the first manufacturing nation of the
world." Id. at 193.
9. H. THORELLI, THE FEDERAL ANTItRUST POLICY 85-86 (1954).
10. See Limbaugh, Historic Origins of Antitrust Legislation, 18 Mo. L. REV. 215, 230-
33 (1953).
11. Id. at 237.
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prospect of piling fortune upon fortune until only self-interest kept
avarice in check. When they had fought to a standstill, these aggrandiz-
ers sought methods of maximizing their profits by minimizing competi-
tion.
First came the pool, a loosely knit organization of independent entre-
preneurs bound by a gentlemen's agreement not to compete too strident-
ly with one another. Its purpose was to ensure price stability in -the
relevant commodity despite market pressure to the contrary. Pools en-
joyed limited success, however. The character of the men involved and
.the temptation to undercut competitors made the pools vulnerable. Since
there was no binding legal force, such informal agreements tended to
collapse too easily in the spirited atmosphere of competition. The hold-
ing company was another device designed to facilitate the inhibition of
competition within an industry. By this device a corporation was formed
to own and deal in stock of other corporations for the purpose, among
others, of restricting competition among them. In 1889 the state of New
Jersey experienced a windfall of revenue when it passed legislation
permitting the establishment of holding companies.' 2
It was the trust, however, which was unequaled in its cunning and
potential for monopolization.13 Its invention, or more precisely, its appli-
cation as a method of aggrandizing economic power on an industrial
scale, is attributed to the legal genius of a small group of lawyers em-
ployed by the Standard Oil Company.' 4 In simple terms, a trust is an
arrangement whereby the owners of stock in several competing com-
panies combine their holdings in a trust account. The trustees are in-
structed to operate the several companies to maximize the profits of the
owners as a group. Insofar as the group obtains power approaching a
monopoly over the industry concerned, the policy which would best
ensure maximum profitability would plainly be the policy which limits
competition as much as possible. 15 In fact, the power wielded by busi-
nesses being operated by trusts around the turn of the century was
astounding. In 1900, the first business census revealed that trusts con-
trolled businesses valued at nine billion dollars. 16
12. Id. at 232-34. The Sherman Act was held applicable to holding companies in
Northern Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197 (1904).
13. J. VON KALINOWSKI, ANTITRUST AND TRADE REGULATION § 2.02(2)(b) (3d ed.
1976). See also Jones, Historical Development of the Law of Business Competition, 36
YALE L.J. 207, 217 (1926).
14. W. GELLHORN, ANTITRUST LAW AND ECONOMICS IN A NUTSHELL 17 n.2 (1976). See
also Limbaugh, supra note 10, at 234-35 nn.97 & 98 (1953).
15. See, e.g., 21 CONG. REC. 137 (1889) (remarks of Senator Turpie).
16. Limbaugh, supra note 10, at 236. The industries controlled by trusts were numer-
ous, including oil, steel, whiskey, salt, sugar, cordage, lead, cottonoil, steel rail, nail,
1977]
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To the American people of the 1870's and 1880's, the trust played the
part of villain, responsible for the economic difficulties which plagued
them. 7 Their impressions were not unfounded. The investigations of
muckrakers and congressional committees pointed out the abuses of the
giant industrial organs. 18 The American public
came to realize that the economic laws of supply and demand,
competition in business and freedom in trade, on which the
economic foundations of the nation were laid, were no longer
effective; that the ideals of equality of opportunity, individual
freedom, self-reliance and personal initiative, which had sus-
tained the character of the nation, were losing their pre-emi-
nence. 
19
In 1887 the Interstate Commerce Act 20 was enacted to curb abuses by
the railroads, 21 targets for some of the earliest and most vehement
criticism.2 2 It was apparent, however, that the abuses of the trusts went
iron, nut and washer, barb fence-wire, copper, slate-pencil, nickel, zinc, oilcloth, jute-
bag, paper envelope, guttapercha, castor oil, borax, ultramarine. VON KALINOWSKI, supra
note 13, at § 2.02(2) n.75.
17. VON KALINOWSKI, supra note 13, at § 2.02(3).
The public placed much of the blame for the several depressions and the
resulting unemployment, business failures, poverty, and other economic evils
upon big business, particularly the pools, trusts, and other vast industrial combi-
nations that controlled much of the nation's economy. By the late 1880's, there
was a widespread public demand for the enactment of a federal statute which
would destroy the power of the trust or, at the least, eliminate their abusive and
monopolistic practices.
Id. See GELLHORN, supra note 14, at 18-19, in which the author suggests that tight money
and protectionist tariffs added to the public's unrest.
18. See generally Limbaugh, supra note 10, at 236-42, 246-47. To obtain the advantages
associated with monopoly power "competitors were ruthlessly eliminated, and the victor
in the conquest was able, at the expense of the public and through the cooperation of other
victors in similar conquests, to fix prices, control markets, and realize profits unhindered
and unrestrained" by the troublesome forces of a free market. Id. at 239. See also REPORT
ON INVESTIGATION OF TRUSTS, H.R. REP. No. 9, 50th Cong., 1st Sess. (1888).
19. Limbaugh, supra note 10, at 237. See also AUSTIN, supra note 1, at § 3.1.
20. Ch. 104, 24 Stat. 379 (1887) (current version at 49 U.S.C. §§ 1-15 (1970)).
21. Limbaugh, supra note 10, at 247. The Interstate Commerce Act provided com-
prehensive regulation of practices in the transportation industry, particularly railroads.
Practices regulated included prices, supply of cars, material to be transported, and
allocation of services among customers. The principal complaints about the railroads
concerned arrangements with the trusts involving rebates and preferential prices. Such an
arrangement between the Standard Oil trust and the railroads was widely reported. Id.
22. Best, The Antitrust Controversy-A Survey, 17 Bus. LAW. 859, 860 (1962). Popular
agitation, especially by groups representing farmers, such as the Grangers, had achieved
the passage of state regulations governing railroads, but the enormity and interstate
character of the business made such regulations relatively ineffective. In Munn v. Illinois,
94 U.S. 113.(1876), the Supreme Court held that states could regulate railroads despite
their interstate character. In Wabash, St. L. & Pac. Ry. v. Illinois, 118 U.S. 557 (1886), the
[Vol. 27:81
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far beyond those of the railroads.2 3 The anger and frustration of the
American people were translated into law with the passage of the Sher-
man Antitrust Act in 1890.24
The Sherman Act, described as similar to a constitutional amendment
in its scope,2 5 proscribed conspiracies or combinations which unreason-
ably restrain trade.26 Congress, whether through inadvertence or, as
suggested in Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader,27 by design, left to the courts
the task of giving specific meaning to the generalities of the Act. 28 During
the early years of the twentieth century, the judiciary was rather sym-
pathetic to laissez-faire economic theories. 29 This sympathy resulted in a
general coolness on the part of the courts toward the antitrust laws and
their enforcement.30 In short, the Sherman Act was not a tremendous
Court severely limited the Munn decision by holding that a state may only regulate
transportation within the state, not transportation through the state.
23. Jones, supra note 13, at 207, 217.
24. Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7
(1970)). See Letwin, Congress and the Sherman Antitrust Law: 1887-1890, 23 U. CHI. L.
REV. 221 (1956); Jones, supra note 13, at 207, 213-19; Limbaugh, supra note 10, at 243-48.
25. The Act, as a "charter of freedom ... has a generality and adaptability compara-
ble to that found to be desirable in constitutional provisions." Appalachian Coals, Inc. v.
United States, 288 U.S. 344, 359-60 (1933).
26. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970). The language of the Sherman Act § 1 literally prohibits all
combinations in restraint of trade. In United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F.
271 (6th Cir. 1898), modified & affd, 175 U.S. 211 (1899), the Court suggested the so-
called "rule of reason" doctrine, under which the Sherman Act was construed to prohibit
only those restraints which unreasonably restrained trade. The rule was explicitly stated
and firmly established in Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911). For a
thorough discussion of the "rule of reason" in the development of the antitrust law, see
M. HANDLER, ANTITRUST IN PERSPECTIVE (1957).
27. 310 U.S. 469, 489 (1940).
28. The Court wrote:
The prohibitions of the Sherman Act were not stated in terms of precision or of
crystal clarity and the Act itself does not define them. In consequence of the
vagueness of its language, perhaps not uncalculated, the courts have been left to
give content to the statute, and in the performance of that function, it is appropri-
ate that courts should interpret its words in light of its legislative history and of
the particular evils at which the legislation was aimed.
Id. In grappling with the slippery concepts of the Act the Court developed, along with the
"rule of reason," the doctrine that certain offenses constitute "per se" offenses, regard-
less of their reasonableness or the benevolence of the actors. E.g., United States v.
Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940) (combination to fix prices is illegal per se).
This concept has, however, not been applied consistently, or in every situation. E.g.,
United States v. Citizens & Southern Nat'l Bank, 422 U.S. 86 (1975) (combination to fix
banking service prices held not per se violation).
29. THORELLI, supra note 9, at 254. "The courts of the nation, now more than ever
intrigued by the philosophy of laissez-faire . . . " had little sympathy for the goals of the
Sherman Act. "The foremost examples of legislation thus suffering at the hands of the
courts were the Sherman Antitrust Act and the Interstate Commerce Act." Id. See
generally GELLHORN, supra note 14, at 24-28.
30. See, e.g., United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895) (refusal to apply
19771
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success during its early years, primarily because of judicial conservatism
and half-hearted enforcement efforts by the Justice Department.3
It was the courts, nevertheless, which were responsible for the eventu-
al renaissance of antitrust legislation. Despite cases such as Northern
Securities Co. v. United States,3 2 the enforcement of the antitrust statute
in the first decade of this century was not as enthusiastic as the people of
the nation wished it to be. When the Supreme Court announced that it
was adopting a "rule of reason" in order to avoid a construction of the
Sherman Act which would have rendered its enforcement impossible,
the public outcry again prodded Congress into action. 33 Two pieces of
legislation emerged. One, the Clayton Act, 34 amended the Sherman Act
to make its prohibitions applicable to specific practices and to activities
with undesirable tendencies as well as completed actions. The other
established the Federal Trade Commission to regulate business practices
in general. 35 It is section 4 of this Clayton Act36 which provides the
consumer with potential weapons against the less conscionable practices
of the businessman.
II. REQUIREMENTS OF THE SECTION 4 ACTION
The Sherman Act as originally passed 37 and the Clayton Act 38 both
provide for the award of treble damages plus costs and reasonable
Sherman Act to manufacturing as opposed to commerce). See also United States v.
Nelson, 52 F. 646 (D. Minn. 1892); In re Greene, 52 F. 104 (S.D. Ohio 1892); In re
Corning, 51 F. 205 (N.D. Ohio 1892).
31. See VON KALINOWSKI, supra note 13, at § 10.02(2). "There was general agreement
that the Sherman Act was not doing the job, that it was vague, and that specific business
practices had to be prohibited by law." Id. at § 10.02(l). See generally Montague, The
Defects of the Sherman Antitrust Law, 19 YALE L.J. 88 (1909).
32. 193 U.S. 197 (1904). In Northern Securities, The Sherman Act was given a literal
interpretation condemning all combinations in restraint of trade. This interpretation was
recognized to be untenable in Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
33. See generally VON KALINOWSKI, supra note 13, at § 10.02(2); AUSTIN, supra note 1,
at § 3.4. See also GELLHORN, supra note 14, at 26-27 n.6, citing a study which showed that
during the first 12 years after passage of the Sherman Act only 23 government prosecu-
tions occurred. Of those, seventeen "were brought by United States attorneys in the field,
not by the Justice Department; and of the six brought by the Justice Department, four
were directed against labor unions and the other two (directed against the beef trust and a
massive railroad merger) came at the end of the period." Id. Professor Gellhorn disputes
the contention, however, that the public was aroused by "quixotic judicial approaches
and executive indifference," but instead attributes the public outcry which was responsi-
ble for passage of the Clayton and Federal Trade Commission Acts to President
Roosevelt's trustbusting rhetoric and his ability to infect the public with enthusiasm for
any cause. Id at 26-27.
34. 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (1970).
35. 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58 (1970).
36. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970).
37. Ch. 647, §§ 1-7, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (current version at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1970)).
38. Ch. 323, § 4, 38 Stat. 731 (1914) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970)).
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attorney's fees to a successful plaintiff in an action based on injury
sustained because of a violation of the antitrust laws. In addition, section
16 of the Clayton Act makes injunctive relief available to the private
plaintiff for "threatened loss or damage by a violation of the antitrust
laws." 39 This article will consider both the essential requirements of an
action brought under section 4 of the Clayton Act,4" and the effective-
ness of trebling damages in deterring potential violators or in compensat-
ing the victims of anticompetitive behavior.
Section 4 authorizes the award of treble damages to "any person who
shall be injured in his business or property by reason of anything forbid-
den in the antitrust laws." '4' The courts have construed section 4 to
require that a plaintiff be a person, as defined in section I of the Clayton
Act, 42 that a violation of the antitrust laws, as defined in section 1, has
occurred, 43 that the plaintiff has suffered an injury to his business or
property, 44 that the causal connection between the antitrust violation and
the injury to plaintiff's business or property be sufficiently proximate, 45
and that plaintiff's injury be reducible to a reasonably approximate dollar
amount .46
The term "person" is defined in section 1 to include corporations and
associations, 47 and has been judicially interpreted to include individuals48
and partnerships. 49 Furthermore, states,50 cities,5" and foreign sover-
39. 15 U.S.C. § 26 (1970).
40. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970).
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. E.g., Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 264 (1972) (the Court construed
"business or property" to mean "commercial interests").
45. The two main tests used are the "direct injury" test, which requires a relationship
similar to privity, and the "target area" test, which requires the plaintiff to have been the
target of the alleged violation, or alternatively, within the area of the economy likely to be
harmed by it. See notes 78-87 & accompanying text infra.
46. Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson Parchment Paper Co., 282 U.S. 555, 562-63 (1931)
(permitting estimation of amount of damages by "just and reasonable inference, although
the result be only approximate").
47. 15 U.S.C. § 12 (1970).
48. E.g., Hoffman Motors Corp. v. Alfa Romeo S.p.A., 244 F. Supp. 70, 82 (S.D.N.Y.
1965) (corporate employee could be sued in his individual capacity for acts committed as
an agent of the corporation). See also Allen Organ Co. v. North Am. Rockwell Corp., 363
F. Supp. 1117, 1129-30 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
49. E.g., Western Laundry & Linen Rental Co. v. United States, 424 F.2d 441,443 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 849 (1970).
50. E.g., Georgia v. Evans, 316 U.S. 159 (1942).
51. E.g., Chattanooga Foundry & Pipe Works v. Atlanta, 203 U.S, 390 (1906).
1977]
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eigns52 have been held to be persons for purposes of the Clayton Act.
The federal government has been held not to be a person because its
enforcement role makes the treble damage inducement unnecessary.5 3
However, an amendment to the Clayton Act enables the federal govern-
ment to sue for a single measure of damages and costs. 54
The antitrust laws, as the term is used in section 4 and defined in
section 1, comprehends only four statutes: the Sherman Act itself, 55 the
Clayton Act, 56 the Wilson Tariff Act, 57 and the act amending the Wilson
Tariff Act.5 8 Because the statutory definition is quite explicit, and de-
spite the existence of other statutes commonly referred to as antitrust
laws which are not included, the Supreme Court has held the doctrine
expressio unius est exclusio alterius applicable. 59 Consequently, the
Court held that only those statutes specifically included in section 1 will,
if violated, support a section 4 action.60 Notably excluded from treble
damage claims by the Court's construction are violations of the Federal
Trade Commission Act 61 and parts of the Robinson-Patman Act.62
The private plaintiff is thus entitled to bring an action for injury
sustained as a result of: (1) a contract or combination in the form of a
trust or otherwise,63 or conspiracy in restraint of interstate or foreign
trade or commerce; 6' (2) attempts or conspiracies to monopolize inter-
52. E.g., In re Antibiotics Antitrust Actions, 333 F. Supp. 315 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (gov-
ernment of Kuwait held to be a person). See also Velvel, Carving Holes in the Sherman
Act: A Comment on the Citizens & Southern Case, 25 CATH. U.L. REV. 535 (1976).
53. E.g., Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
54. 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (1970).
55. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1970).
56. 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (1970).
57. 15 U.S.C. §§ 8-11 (1970) (proscribing activities which restrain trade in imported
goods).
58. Ch. 40, 37 Stat. 667 (1913) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 11 (1970)).
59. Expression of one thing is the exclusion of another. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 693
(4th ed. 1951).
60. Nashville Milk Co. v. Carnation Co., 355 U.S. 373, 376 (1968).
61. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1970), proscribing "unfair methods of competition ... and unfair
or deceptive practices" in or affecting commerce. See, e.g., Carlson v. Coca-Cola Co.,
318 F. Supp. 785 (N.D. Cal. 1970), aff'd, 483 F.2d 279 (9th Cir. 1973).
62. Section 3 of the Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1970), along with § 2 of
the Clayton Act, as amended by § I of the Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1970),
prohibits selling "at unreasonably low prices for the purpose of destroying a competitor."
Because § 3 has been held to be a separate and independent statute, rather than an
amendment of the Clayton Act, no private treble damage action will lie for violation of its
provisions, except insofar as the same activity is proscribed independently by the Clayton
Act. See generally VON KALINOWSKI, supra note 13, at § 11.01(1).
63. The form of agreement has been interpreted to require two elements; that more
than one person be involved, and that there be a common design or purpose. See, e.g.,
Poller v. CBS, 368 U.S. 464 (1962); Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, 340
U.S. 211 (1950).
64. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970).
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state foreign trade; 65 (3) discrimination in prices, services, or facilities
which may have the effect of substantially lessening competition or
creating monopoly conditions; 66 (4) tying agreements, exclusive dealing
agreements, and requirement contracts ;67 (5) illegal corporate mergers or
acquisitions; 68 or (6) the existence of interlocking directorates in certain
situations. 69 The burden is upon the plaintiff to prove that a violation of
the antitrust laws has occurred. 70 This considerable task is often lifted
from the shoulders of the private plaintiff, however, by section 5 of the
Clayton Act 71 which provides that a final judgment or decree in a govern-
ment antitrust action determining that the defendant has violated the
antitrust laws is prima facie evidence against that defendant in a subse-
quent private action arising out of the same violation.72 The prima facie
effect is limited, however, by the exclusion of consent judgments or
decrees entered prior to the taking of any testimony and by the exclu-
sion of judgments or decrees in actions by the federal government under
65. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1970).
66. 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1970).
67. Tying agreements require a customer to purchase product X in order to be allowed
to purchase product Y. Exclusive dealing arrangements require a buyer to sell only
products of company X; if the buyer also sells products of company Y, company X will
refuse to deal with him. Requirement contracts require a buyer to purchase all his
requirements from the same seller. The anticompetitive effect of each is readily apparent.
68. Two examples are those which may substantially lessen competition or which tend
to create monopoly conditions. Because § 7 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1970), is
prospective in forbidding the future acquisitions of companies, some courts have held that
a plaintiff cannot be damaged by an action which has not yet occurred and that conse-
quently a § 7 violation will not ground a § 4 action. E.g., Gottesman v. General Motors
Corp., 221 F. Supp. 488, 493 (S.D.N.Y. 1963), rev'd, 414 F.2d 956 (2d Cir. 1965), cert.
denied, 403 U.S. 811 (1970). The reversal, the following cases, and commentators indi-
cate, however, that this argument has not been favored. See, e.g., Minnesota Mining &
Mfg. Co. v. New Jersey Wood Finishing Co., 381 U.S. 311 (1965) (by implication); Stein,
Section 7 of the Clayton Act As a Basis for the Treble Damage Action: When May the
Private Litigant Bring His Suit?, 56 CALIF. L. REV., 968 (1968); Note, Private Actions
Under Sections 4 and 7 of the Clayton Act: A Fresh Look At an Old Problem, 29 OHIO ST.
L.J. 756 (1968). Cf. GAF Corp. v. Circle Floor, 329 F. Supp. 823, 829 (S.D.N.Y. 1971),
aff'd, 463 F.2d 752 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 413 U.S. 901 (1972) (damages held too remote to
permit recovery in uncompleted merger).
69. 15 U.S.C. §§ 19-20 (1970) (interlocking directorates and officers in banks and
common carriers dealing with suppliers who have officers in common with the carrier).
70. E.g., Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 311 F.2d 764, 767 (9th Cir. 1963), rev'd on other
grounds, 377 U.S. 13 (1964); Glenn Coal Co. v. Dickinson Fuel Co., 72 F.2d 885 (4th Cir.
1934). See generally Lanzillotti, Problems of Proof of Damages in Antitrust Suits, 16
ANTITRUST BULL. 329 (1971); Comment, Proof Requirements in Antitrust Suits: The
Obstacles to Treble-Damage Recovery, 18 CHI. L. REV. 130 (1950).
71. 15 U.S.C. § 16 (1970), as amended by Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act of
1974, Pub. L. No. 93-528, 88 Stat. 1706.
72. Id. at § 16(a).
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section 4a of the Clayton Act.73 The purpose of section 5 is consistent
with antitrust policy in general, particularly the policy underlying section
4. By easing the evidentiary burden on the private plaintiff, section 5
encourages privately initiated suits. Such suits have traditionally been
regarded as essential to antitrust enforcement. 74 Section 5 also encour-
ages defendants in government actions to settle cases early, 75 thereby
reducing the strain on the thinly spread personnel of the two principal
enforcement agencies. 76
Having demonstrated a violation and an injury, the private plaintiff
must connect them. The connection may not be indirect or tenuous.77
73. Additionally, the courts have held that nolo contendere pleas do not have prima
facie effect. E.g., Twin Ports Oil Co. v. Pure Oil Co., 26 F. Supp. 366 (D. Minn. 1939).
74. On the eve of the passage of the Clayton Act, President Wilson addressed Congress
in the following terms:
We shall agree in giving private individuals who claim to have been damaged by
these processes the right to found their suits for redress upon the facts and
judgments proved and entered in suits by the Government where the Government
has upon its own initiative sued the combination complained of and won its suit
... .It is not fair that the private litigant should be obliged to set up and
establish again facts which the Government has proved. He cannot afford, he has
not the power, to make use of such processes of inquiry as the Government has
command of. Thus shall individual justice be done while the processes of busi-
ness are rectified and squared with the general conscience.
Address of Pregident Wilson, 63d Cong., 2d Sess., 51 CONG. REC. 1964 (1914). See United
States v. Borden Co., 347 U.S. 514, 518 (1954); Quemos Theatre Co. v. Warner Bros.
Pictures, Inc., 35 F. Supp. 949, 950 (D.N.J. 1940). See generally Wham, Antitrust Treble-
Damage Suits: The Government's Chief Aid in Enforcement, 40 A.B.A.J. 1061 (1954). But
see Breit & Elzinga, Antitrust Enforcement and Economic Efficiency: The Uneasy Case
for Treble-Damages, 17 J. L. & EcoN. 329 (1974), in which the authors conclude that the
efficacy of the § 4 action has been overrated; Wheeler, Antitrust Treble-Damage Actions:
Do They Work?, 61 CALIF. L. REv. 1319 (1973).
75. For criticism of and proposals for the reform of consent decrees in antitrust
prosecutions, see Zimmer & Sullivan, Consent Decree Settlements by Administrative
Agencies in Antitrust and Employment Discrimination: Optimizing Public and Private
Interests, 1976 DUKE L.J. 163; Comment, Private Participation in Department of Justice
Antitrust Proceedings, 39 U. CHI. L. REV. 143 (1971). See also Antitrust Procedures and
Penalties Act of 1974, 15 U.S.C. §§ 16(b), (d) (1976) (providing courts with power to
review proposed settlements for compliance with the public interest and requiring notice
in the Federal Register).
76. See Crumpler, An Alternative to Public and Victim Enforcement of the Federal
Securities and Antitrust Laws: Citizen Enforcement, 13 HARV. J. LEGIS. 76, 84 n.49
(1975). "The threat of a subsequent private suit has a great effect upon the defendants
.... as is evidenced by the great propensity of alleged violators in antitrust prosecutions
to agree to nolo contendere pleas, which cannot be raised in subsequent private litiga-
tion." Id. See also Blecher, The Only Game in Town, 8 Sw. U.L. REV 550, 555 (1976).
"Perhaps it is the Department [of Justice] that in some instances first exposes the
violation by reasons [sic] of its superior investigatory resources, but the real fear, indeed,
the real deterrence, is having to pay these extraordinary sums in settlement of private
litigation or risk the potential of treble damages." Id.
77. E.g., Long Island Lighting Co. v. Standard Oil Co., 521 F.2d 1269 (2d Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1073 (1976). The court of appeals wrote that "even parties whose
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Federal courts of appeals have established tests for determining who has
standing to bring a section 4 action which turn on the proximity of the
injury to the violation.7 8 The "direct injury" test denies standing to a
plaintiff whose injury is not the direct consequence of the violation. 79
This often depends on the nature of the relationship of the parties. For
instance, one court has adopted what amounts to a "competitors only"
standard, limiting recovery to competitors of the defendant. 80 It has been
suggested that such a restrictive application of the "direct injury" test
"would emasculate the treble damage remedy.''81 The other stand-
ing test traditionally applied by courts of appeal is the "target area"
test. 82 As interpreted by the Second Circuit, this test depends not on the
privity considerations employed by the Third Circuit's "competitors
only" test, but on whether or not the plaintiff was within the area
targeted by the alleged violation.83 In Mulvey v. Samuel Goldwyn Pro-
injuries may be both immediate and foreseeable may lack standing to pursue a private
remedy if that injury is indirect or incidental." 521 F.2d at 1274. The court upheld
dismissal of one of several counts in an action by electric utilities against oil companies
who, in boycotting Libyan and Saudi oil, had allegedly caused an increase in the price of
fuel to the utilities. The court reasoned that the electric companies were mere customers
and not an object of the boycottor (oil distributor) and thus too tenuously connected to it
to be allowed to bring a § 4 action. Id. at 1273.
78. See generally Sherman, Antitrust Standing: From Loeb to Malamud, 51 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 374 (1976); Comment, Private Plaintiff's Standing Under Clayton Act Section 4:
Clothing the Naked Emperor, 7 SETON HALL L. REV. 588 (1976).
79. E.g., Loeb v. Eastman Kodak Co., 183 F.2d 704, 709 (3d Cir. 1910) (employee,
director, stockholder, and creditor of company allegedly harmed by defendant's violation
did not have standing).
80. Cromar Co. v. Nuclear Materials & Equip. Corp., 1975-1 Trade Cas. (CCH)
1 60,373 (M.D. Pa. 1975). See Sherman, supra note 78, at 380-82.
81. Sherman, supra note 78, at 382.
82. For a recent comprehensive discussion of the "target area'test and an argument
for its continued use, see Lytle & Purdue, Antitrust Target Area Under Section 4 of the
Clayton Act: Determination of Standing in Light of the Alleged Antitrust Violation, 25
AM. U.L. REV. 795 (1976).
83. E.g., Calderone Enterprises Corp. v. United Artists Theatre Circuit, Inc., 454 F.2d
1292, 1296 & n.2 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 930 (1972). The distinction between
the "direct injury" test and the "target area" test in Calderone is not as clear as it is in the
Ninth Circuit. The Second Circuit requires that the plaintiff's activities themselves be
threatened by the alleged conspiracy, whereas the Ninth Circuit requires only that plaintiff
be in the area foreseeably endangered by the alleged violation. Compare Fields Prods.,
Inc. v. United Artists Corp., 318 F. Supp. 87 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), aff'd, 432 F.2d 1010 (2d
Cir. 1970) (percuriam), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 949 (1971) with Mulvey v. Samuel Goldwyn
Prods., 433 F.2d 1073 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 923 (1971). Both cases
involved actions by motion picture producers whose contracts with the defendant dis-
tributors prohibited the use of "block booking" arrangements. Block booking ties licens-
ing of one film to acceptance by the licensee of a block of other less desirable films. In
Fields, the Second Circuit denied a producer standing on the ground that the "target area"
included only the television stations and competitors of the block booking distributor. In
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ductions,84 the Ninth Circuit applied a variation of the "target area" test,
which looked to the area of the economy which is threatened with harm
or collapse as a result of the defendant's alleged anticompetitive behav-
ior. If the plaintiff is within that sector of the economy, he has stand-
ing.85 The Ninth Circuit, in its broad construction of "target area,"
introduced the element of foreseeability into the antitrust standing ques-
tion.86 The application of foreseeability can be criticized as making
possible recovery by remotely damaged plaintiffs. On the other hand, the
Mulvey decision strongly suggests that the plaintiff must be "hit square-
ly" by the effects of the alleged violation, indicating that foreseeability
by itself is not sufficient to confer standing.87
The Sixth Circuit, eschewing both the "direct injury" and "target
area" tests as improper considerations of the merits of the plaintiff's
claim in the guise of a standing question, utilized a third test in Malamud
v. Sinclair Oil Corp. 88 In Malamud, the court adopted the test estab-
lished by the Supreme Court in Association of Data Processing Service
Organizations, Inc. v. Camp.8 9 This two-pronged test for use in suits
challenging the actions of administrative agencies requires the plaintiff to
assert injury in fact caused by the defendant and to demonstrate that the
interest the plaintiff seeks to vindicate is "arguably within the zone of
interests" protected by the relevant statute. 90 Traditionally, the courts
have employed restrictive standing tests that reflect the judiciary's
understandable reluctance to encourage spurious litigation and the po-
tentially disastrous effects of recovery by remotely injured plaintiffs that
may result from the rippling effect of antitrust violations. The Sixth
Circuit's approach, on the other hand, gives life to the words of section 4
itself, which place no restrictions on the proximity of the plaintiff's
injury, other than the requirement that it be "by reason of" the alleged
violation. 91
Finally, an action for treble damages requires the plaintiff to demon-
Mulvey, however, the Ninth Circuit held that the producer was within the "target area"
because he was directly and foreseeably affected by the alleged violation.
84. 443 F.2d 1073 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 923 (1971).
85. See id. at 1076.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. 521 F.2d 1142, 1148-51 (6th Cir. 1975) (standing granted to real estate companies
damaged by defendant's breach of an oral agreement to provide financing in connection
with the leasing of service stations).
89. 397 U.S. 150 (1970).
90. Id. at 153. For a criticism of the use of this standard in antitrust cases, see
Sherman, supra note 78, at 342-405.
91. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976).
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strate that his injury is reducible to a reasonable dollar estimation.
Having proved that he suffered damages, the plaintiff may rely on some
"just and reasonable inference" in calculating the dollar amount.92
If the private plaintiff has met each of the requirements outlined
above, he will have established a prima facie case for recovery of treble
damages under section 4. Assuming his action is not barred by the statute
of limitations contained in section 4b,93 the suit should not be dismissed
on the pleadings. The cause of action under section 4 arises at the
moment the plaintiff's interests are harmed or invaded by the defend-
ant's violation. 94 If the harm is the result of continuous or repeated
violations, a new cause of action arises each time an injury occurs and
the four-year limitations period is renewed with each violation. 95
The Supreme Court has ruled that when damages cannot be proved
within the four-year period, the running of the statute of limitations is
tolled until damages can be established.' Further softening the effect of
the four-year limitations period is section 5i of the Clayton Act, which
tolls the statute of limitations during the pendency, and for one year
following the termination, of "any civil or criminal proceeding . . .
instituted by the United States to prevent, restrain, or punish violations
of any of the antitrust laws." 97 Section 5i operates whenever there is
substantial similarity between private and governmental claims. 98 As
long as the activities giving rise to the actions are substantially the same,
it is not necessary that all the parties or issues involved be identical. 91
Government suits terminate when a final order is entered by consent
decree, by disposition or appeal, or by the running of the period for
appeal of judgment."° In addition to the tolling effect of government
actions, the running of the four-year period may also be suspended
92. Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson Parchment Paper Co., 282 U.S. 555, 563 (1931)
(upholding jury's estimation of damages based on the difference between prices prior to
and during a conspiracy to manipulate prices).
93. 15 U.S.C. § 15(b) (1976) (four-year statute of limitations).
94. E.g., Continental-Wirt Elecs. Corp. v. Lancaster Glass Corp., 459 F.2d 768, 770
(3d Cir. 1972).
95. E.g., Twin-City Sportservice, Inc. v. Charles 0. Finley & Co., 512 F.2d 1264 (9th
Cir. 1975), rev'd and remanded on other grounds, 365 F. Supp. 235 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
96. E.g., Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 401 U.S. 321, 339 (1971).
97. 15 U.S.C. § 16(i) (1976). E.g., Barnett v. Warner Bros. Pictures Distrib. Corp., 112
F. Supp. 5, 7 (N.D. III. 1953).'Actions for single damages by the federal government under
§ 4a of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15a (1976), do not toll the statute.
98. E.g., Leh v. General Petroleum Corp., 382 U.S. 54, 63 (1965).
99. Michigan v. Morton Salt Co., 259 F. Supp. 35, 54 (D. Minn. 1966), aff'd on other
grounds sub nom. Hardy Salt Co. v. Illinois, 377 F.2d 768 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S.
912.(1967).
100. Russ Togs, Inc. v. Grinnell Corp., 426 F.2d 850, 857 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 400
U.S. 878 (1970).
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during periods in which the defendant has fraudulently concealed the
violation from the plaintiff.'' Duress, 02 dominance, 03 or infancy' °4 may
also cause the tolling of the statute.
III. THE CLASS ACTION UNDER FEDERAL RULE 23
Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, au-
thorizes the maintenance of class actions.105 In providing the possibility
of redress to many plaintiffs whose individual injuries are small, the
class action has been hailed as "one of the most socially useful remedies
in history."'06 The deterrent value of the class action has also been
widely proclaimed. Other commentators, particularly among the defend-
ant's bar, have had harsh words for the class action, terming it, for
example, "a form of legalized blackmail" making "the only significant
issue . . . the size of the ransom to be paid for total peace."10 7 The most
serious criticism of the class action, particularly as it has been used in
private antitrust suits, concerns its alleged tendency to sacrifice the
defendant's substantive rights in the interest of procedural efficiency
and judicial economy. 1 8
In order to maintain a class action, the potential class representative
must demonstrate compliance with the requirements of rule 23. Subsec-
tion (a) requires that:
(1) joinder be impracticable because of the large number of
class members;
(2) there be common questions of law or fact;
101. E.g., Public Serv. Co. v. General Elec. Co., 315 F.2d 306, 310-12 (10th Cir. 1963)
(fraudulent concealment of price-fixing by electrical equipment manufacturers tolled
statute of limitations). Accord, Atlantic City Elec. Co. v. General Elec. Co., 312 F.2d 236
(2d Cir. 1962); Kansas City v. Federal Pac. Elec. Co., 310 F.2d 271 (8th Cir. 1962).
102. E.g., Miller Motors, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 149 F. Supp. 790 (M.D.N.C. 1957),
aff'd, 252 F.2d 441 (4th Cir. 1958).
103. E.g., International Rys. v. United Fruit Co., 373 F.2d 408 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
387 U.S. 921 (1967).
104. Cf. Hall v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 312 F. Supp. 358, 361-62 (E.D.N.Y.
1970) (suit dismissed when-plaintiffs failed to show that infants could not have timely sued
through a guardian).
105. FED. R. Civ. P. 23. The 1966 amendment made inclusion of class members in a
(b)(3) action automatic rather than dependent on an affirmative act as under the old rule.
See 3B MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 23.02-1 (2d ed. 1977).
106. Pomerantz, New Developments In Class Actions-Has Their Death Knell Been
Sounded?, 25 Bus. LAW. 1259 (1970).
107. Handler, The Shift From Substantive to Procedural Innovations In Antitrust
Suits-The Twenty-Third Annual Antitrust Review, 71 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 9 (1971).
108. Pollock, Class Actions Reconsidered: Theory and Practice Under Amended Rule
23, 28 Bus. LAW. 741, 746 passim (1973). Examples include the right to confront adverse
witnesses and to require plaintiffs to prove damages individually.
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(3) the claims of the representative be typical of the claims of
the class; ° and
(4) the class representative fairly and adequately represent the
class. 110
Initially, the prospective class representative must show both that a
class exists and that he is a member of that class.11 Next, he must
convince the court that the large number of class members makes joinder
impracticable. 12 There is very little consistency in the case law regarding
the number necessary to make that showing. 113 Classes have been cer-
tified with as few as twenty-five members,' 14 but denied with as many as
three hundred." 5 The requirement that there be common questions of
law or fact1 16 is likely to be met whenever the class members stand in
similar relationships to and have been similarly harmed by the defend-
ant.117 Dissimilarity in the business relationships between various class
members and the defendant is likely to result in denial of class certifica-
tion. 1 8 The prospective representative must be prepared at the outset to
give the court some approximate idea of the number of members in-
cluded in the class he purports to represent." 9
The third requirement imposed on the aspiring class representative is a
showing that the claims made are typical of those of the class.1 20 This
109. Alternatively, since it is possible to have a class of defendants, the defenses
advanced by the representative must be typical. E.g., Research Corp. v. Pfister Assoc.
Growers, Inc., 301 F. Supp. 497 (N.D. 111. 1969) (over 400 defendants made up the class).
110. FED. R. Civ. P. 23.
111. Abercrombie v. Lum's, Inc., 345 F. Supp. 387, 393 (S.D. Fla. 1972), aff'd, 531
F.2d 775 (5th Cir. 1976).
112. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1).
113. See generally VON KAL!NOWSKI, supra note 13, at § 108.02(2) and cases cited
therein.
114. Philadelphia Elec. Co. v. Anaconda Am. Brass Co., 43 F.R.D. 452 (E.D. Pa.
1968).
115. Minersville Coal Co. v. Anthracite Export Ass'n, 55 F.R.D. 426 (M.D. Pa. 1971).
116. FED. R. Civ. P. 23 (a)(2).
117. E.g., Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555 (2d Cir. 1968). Eisen was an
investor suing odd-lot brokers on behalf of himself and other investors for injuries caused
by alleged illegal surcharges. The class was subsequently held to be unmanageable. 479
F.2d 1005 (2d Cir. 1973), aff'd on other grounds, 417 U.S. 156 (1974).
118. E.g., Thompson v. T.F.I. Cos., 64 F.R.D. 140 (N.D. 111. 1974) (the prospective
class representative was a former franchisee who sought to represent a class including
present franchisees).
119. E.g., Sims v. Parke-Davis & Co., 334 F. Supp. 774, 781 (E.D. Mich. 1971), aff'd,
453 F.2d 1259 (6th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 978 (1972) (denial of class status to
class of prisoners in state penal institutions because counsel failed to provide court with
information "from which the approximate number of class members can be ascertained."
Id. at 781).
120. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(3).
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requirement has been regarded as duplicative by both courts' 2 ' and
commentators'2 2 because satisfaction of either rule 23(a)(2)'s common-
ality requirement or the adequacy of representation requirement of rule
23(a)(4) would seem sufficient. Clearly, if the primary claim of a pros-
pective representative were atypical, he would almost certainly be dis-
qualified because of his incapacity to represent the class adequately
under (a)(4). The issue of typicality, like the question of commonality
under (a)(2), is often answered by reference to the business relationship
of the putative class with the defendant. 23 Differences in the amount of
damages or volume of business are not likely, however, to be dispositive
of the typicality question if the basis for the damages is the same for all
class members. 
24
The final requirement of rule 23(a) is that the prospective class repre-
sentative be in a position to protect adequately the interests of the class
as a whole.12 5 Because of the binding effect of a final judgment on all
members of the class, the courts have recognized their duty to evaluate
carefully a prospective representative's ability to act as champion of the
class's cause. 126 Among the factors considered in such an evaluation are
the qualifications and experience of the representative's legal counsel 27
and the possibility of conflicts of interest between the representative and
other members of the class. 28 If there is some doubt as to whether
potential conflicts exist, the court may certify the class subject to revo-
cation of certification if the conflict materializes. 129 On the other hand,
the party seeking to represent the class need not demonstrate that the
members of the class unanimously approve of his representation. 3 0 In
the typical treble damage class action (certified under 23(b)(3)), class
members who wish to exclude themselves may do so, and their decision
121. E.g., Ungar v. Dunkin' Donuts of America, Inc., 68 F.R.D. 65, 136 (E.D. Pa.
1975), rev'd on other grounds, 531 F.2d 1211 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 823 (1976).
122. E.g., 3B MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 23.06-1, at 23-301 (2d ed. 1977).
123. E.g., Seligson v. Plum Tree, Inc., 55 F.R.D. 259, 262 (E.D. Pa. 1972), class
certification revoked on other grounds, 61 F.R.D. 343 (E.D. Pa. 1973) (plaintiff's allega-
tion that class of franchisees all had similar agreements with franchisor sufficient on
typicality issue).
124. E.g., Philadelphia v. American Oil Co., 53 F.R.D. 45, 67-68 (D.N.J. 1971).
125. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4).
126. E.g., Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555, 562-63 (2d Cir. 1968).
127. !d.
128. E.g., National Auto Brokers Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 376 F. Supp. 620,
636-37 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (denial of class status because of pending lawsuits between
members of class).
129. FED. R. Civ. P. 23 (c). E.g., Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc., 271 F. Supp. 722, 728
(N.D. Cal. 1967) (class certification conditional and subject to further orders of court).
130. See, e.g., Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555, 563 (2d Cir. 1968).
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to do so in small numbers will not affect the ability of the representative
to achieve certification. 3'
While rule 23(a) lists four conditions which the plaintiff must meet in
order to maintain a class action, 23(b) indicates the four situations in
which a class action is appropriate. 132 Rule 23(b)(1)(A) permits a class
action if there is the danger that separate litigation of the members'
claims might result in inconsistent or contradictory results.'33 Rule
23(b)(1)(B) concerns the detrimental effect on potential class members of
separate adjudications in which they were not represented. 34 Section
(1)(B) thus applies to "situations where the judgment in a non-class
action by or against an individual member of the class, while not techni-
cally including the other members, might do so as a practical matter." ' 35
Separately and in concert, rules 23(b)(1)(A) and (b)(1)(B) require a signi-
ficant risk that potential class members or the party opposing the class
would be prejudiced by denial of class certification.
The second situation in which a class action is appropriate is when the
class is defined by the actions of the party opposing it. In this situation,
the rule speaks in terms of injunctive or declaratory relief. 136 Although
damages may also be awarded, the principal relief sought must be equit-
able. 137
Antitrust class actions are predominantly of the type authorized by
rule 23(b)(3).138 The (b)(3) action is appropriate when there exist among
the members of the class common questions of law or fact which pre-
dominate over other questions and the class action is superior to other
methods of bringing the action. 139 This means that members' claims must
share a central and predominant core issue. The second half of the (b)(3)
requirement, that the class action be superior to other methods of ad-
judicating the matter, requires that alternatives such as joinder and
consolidation be found less conducive to the goal of promoting "uni-
formity of decision as to persons similarly situated, without sacrificing
procedural fairness or bringing about other undesirable results."' 140 The
131. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2).
132. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b).
133. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1)(A).
134. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1)(B).
135. Id., advisory committee notes to 1966 amendments.
136. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2).
137. E.g., Robertson v. National Basketball Ass'n, 389 F. Supp. 867, 900 (S.D.N.Y.
1975) (denial of class status because members of the class found to be more interested in
damages than in injunctive relief).
138. E.g., Al Barnett & Sons v. Outboard Marine Corp., 64 F.R.D. 43, 47 n.2 (D. Del.
1974). See also Annot. 6 A.L.R. FED. 348 (1971).
139. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).
140. FED. R. CIv. P. 23(b)(3) and advisory committee notes to 1966 amendments.
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rule lists four considerations relevant to the findings required, namely,
the possibility that individual members may have an interest in control-
ling the conduct of litigation individually, the existence of pending litiga-
tion involving related issues or parties, the desirability of a single forum
for the litigation of all claims, and the difficulties to be expected in
managing the class.'
41
Rule 23 (c)(2) requires that in a (b)(3) action the potential class mem-
bers must be given "the best practicable notice under the circumstances,
including individual notice to all members who can be identified through
reasonable effort.' 1 42 The Supreme Court, in the famous Eisen v. Car-
lisle & Jacquelin decision,143 held that the notice requirement is absolute
and that the expense of such notification must be borne by the plain-
tiff.'" The effect of this decision has been to diminish substantially the
value of the (b)(3) action as a tool for the vindication of individually small
injuries to large numbers of plaintiffs. As in Eisen, the expense of notice
to the typically numerous identifiable members of the class is certain in
many, if not most, (b)(3) actions to render the action beyond the means
of the class representative. However, while the effect of the Eisen
decision should not be underestimated, the class action is by no means
useless in redressing injury to large groups of consumers caused by
antitrust violations. As Justice Douglas noted in his partial dissent in
Eisen, 1 5 subdivision (c)(4)(B) of the rule permits creation of subclas-
ses.'" By limiting the size of the class in this manner, it should be
possible to reduce the burdensome effect of notice to manageable pro-
portions. Power to divide a class once certified resides in the court. 147
Careful consideration of the expense to be anticipated in notifying identi-
fiable class members by counsel could result in carefully tailored classes.
In this manner, the plaintiffs in an antitrust class action can test the water
without expending huge sums on notice prior to any judicial con-
sideration of the merits of their cases.
Alternatively, if injunctive relief is the major remedy sought by the
class, subdivision (b)(2) may be utilized.'" If, on the other hand, the
plaintiffs stand in a uniform legal or contractual relationship to the
defendant, so that inconsistent results in lawsuits brought by individual
141. Id.
142. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2).
143. 417 U.S. 156 (1974).
144. Id. at 177.
145. Id. at 179 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
146. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(4)(B).
147. E.g., Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 181 (1974) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting).
148. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2).
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class members would "establish incompatible standards of conduct"' 14 9
for the defendant, the plaintiffs may avail themselves of subdivision
(b)(l)(A). 10 Despite a few aberrant decisions, 151 however, the great
weight of authority holds that (b)(1) and (b)(2) 152 are not appropriate for
the maintenance of antitrust actions.'5 3
IV. THE EFFECTIVENESS OF SECTION 4 IN COMPENSATING
VICTIMS AND DETERRING OFFENDERS
The effectiveness of the antitrust treble damage action has been the
subject of lively debate during the last decade.' 54 The policy underlying
section 4 is a combination of solicitude for the injured citizen and a
recognition of the inadequacy of the government's enforcement ap-
paratus to either detect or deter most violations." 55 Traditionally, not
only was the effectiveness of the treble damage provision almost univer-
sally accepted, but it was also assumed that the remedy was necessary to
effectuate the policy underlying the antitrust laws. 156 According to the
traditional view, the consumer and the competitor are sufficiently en-
couraged by the prospect of a treble damage recovery to act as a sup-
plementary force of antitrust enforcers. Doubt has been cast, however,
on both the deterrent and compensatory value of the treble damage
action. 157
Underlying this skepticism about section 4's deterrent and compensa-
tory value are several contentions. Because of the difficulty of proving a
violation except for cases in which there is a prior judgment against the
defendant in a government action, the typical private action follows a
government action rather than turning over virgin antitrust soil. Indeed,
one commentator was moved to comment: "We may be witnessing
almost a reversal of the traditional roles. The private antitrust remedy
was designed as a supplement to the government remedy . . . . But
today it is at least a debatable question as to what is supplementing
149. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1)(A).
150. Id.
151. E.g., Minnesota v. United States Steel Corp., 44 F.R.D. 559 (D. Minn. 1968).
152. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1) & (2).
153. Annot., 6 A.L.R. FED. 45 (1971).
154. See, e.g., Antitrust Symposium: The Effectiveness of the Private Treble Damage
Action as an Antitrust Enforcement Mechanism, 8 Sw. U.L. REV. 505 (1976) and articles
collected therein.
155. See, e.g., Perma-Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134,
139 (1968).
156. See Loevinger, Private Action-The Strongest Pillar of Antitrust, 3 ANTITRUST
BULL. 167 (1958). But see Breit, Efficiency and Equity Considerations, 8 Sw. U. L. REV.
539 (1976).
157. See, e.g., Breit & Elzinga, supra note 74.
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what.' 58 Although by far the greater number of modern private treble
damage actions may bear a parasitic relationship to government actions,
other commentators have stated that because of official reluctance to
pursue certain types of violations or violations in certain sectors of the
economy, the need for the private action continues. 159 Additionally, the
Justice Department, which is the primary arm of the government in
antitrust enforcement, frequently reaffirms its support of the private
action as a necessary and desirable addition to the government's ef-
forts. 160
A second criticism frequently leveled at the section 4 action, especially
when brought by a class under rule 23, is that it is often plaintiffs'
attorneys who benefit substantially from such actions rather than the
victims. 161 Probably the most famous treble damage class action was
Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin.162 That case, which involved a class of
some 6,000,000 members, was finally declared unmanageable, but would
have resulted in an average recovery of only $3.90 per class member
after trebling. 63 Small individual recoveries coupled with large attor-
ney's fees are frequently cited by critics of the treble damage provi-
sion. 164 It is by no means clear, however, that such cases are the rule, or
that because an individual's injury is insignificant in relation to the injury
to the class, the individual should be without a remedy. To argue that the
administrative costs of a treble damage class action are very high, or that
attorneys make large fees while victims receive paltry recoveries, does
not rebut the equitable principle that an injury deserves a remedy. Even
to say that under the existing system consumers often fail to recover
because of difficulties with notice in class actions is an indictment not of
the compensatory goal of section 4, but of the imperfect procedural
mechanisms for realizing that goal.
The principal arguments advanced by critics of the section 4 action
focus on two points: 65 judicial efficiency is ill-served by encouraging
suits of the size and complexity of many section 4 actions, and the treble
158. Pollock, Standing to Sue, Remoteness of Injury, and the Passing-On Doctrine, 32
ANTITRUST L.J. 5, 5 (1966).
159. Blecher, supra note 76, at 556. The author, a distinguished antitrust attorney,
states that "there are substantial and important segments of the enforcement effort that
are simply not undertaken by the government. . . because, individually, they do not have
overriding public significance." Id.
160. Rashid, A Government Perspective, 8 Sw. U.L. REV. 515 (1976).
161. Wheeler, supra note 74, at 1337-40.
162. 52 F.R.D. 253 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), rev'd, 479 F.2d 1005 (2d Cir. 1973), aff'd on other
grounds, 417 U.S. 156 (1974).
163. 479 F.2d at 1010.
164. See, e.g., Handler, supra note 107, at 9.
165. E.g., Breit & Elzinga, supra note 74; Wheeler, supra note 74.
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damage action imperfectly effects the goal of compensating the consum-
er victims of antitrust violations. While neither point is without merit,
both fail to meet head-on the arguments in favor of the remedy provided
by section 4. A third criticism is founded on the questionable assertion
that corporate managers are likely to be deterred by the amount of the
possible fine, rather than by the likelihood of being caught. From this
assumption the critics conclude that the most efficient deterrent would
be a very heavy fine regardless of the chances of detection and prosecu-
tion. 166 The policy of section 4, however, is directed not only at deter-
rence but also at compensation of victims. The object ought to be to
maximize both without sacrificing either. Assuming arguendo that little
compensation occurs, the solution should be to facilitate, not eradicate,
compensation.
Various procedural means of easing the plaintiff's burden-more real-
istic notice requirements in 23(b)(3) actions, permitting offensive use of
the passing-on theory, 167 less prohibitive standing tests (such as the
broad "target area" test of the Ninth Circuit,168 or the "zone of interest"
test adopted by the Sixth Circuit 6 9), more extensive inclusion of nolo
contendere pleas and consent decrees within the prima facie evidence
presumption of section 5i of the Clayton Act-would make compensa-
tion more available while increasing the deterrent effect of section 4
actions.1 70 Certainly none of these suggestions is without its drawbacks.
Any suit requires the expenditure of scarce judicial resources and to
some extent entails an imperfect allocation of damages. If compensation
of the individual injured by antitrust violations is an unattainable goal,
fluid recovery such as that envisioned by the parens patriae act,' 7'
166. Id.
167. The "passing-on" theory used offensively would allow consumers to sue because
the illegal overcharge borne by the retailer was passed on to them. See subsection V infra
for discussion of this concept. Contra, Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977).
168. E.g., Mulvey v. Samuel Goldwyn Prods., 433 F.2d 1073 (9th Cir. 1970), cert.
denied, 402 U.S. 923 (1971). See notes 84-87 & accompanying text supra.
169. See notes 88-91 & accompanying text supra.
170. On the other hand, giving prima facie effect to nolo pleas and consent decrees
would very likely decrease the government's success in obtaining them and consequently
reduce the government's effectiveness. To that extent, the deterrent might be reduced
because of the diminished likelihood that the government would be able to bring as many
suits as is now the case. However, the increased possibility of treble damage actions being
brought in the wake of such government actions as could be brought would probably
counteract the reduced deterrent effect attributable to fewer actions by the government.
171. Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-435, 90 Stat. 1390 (amending
15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976)). Section 4e of the Act requires that potential claimants be given a
chance to assert their claims against the fund created by aggregating damages. Following
disbursement to those with legitimate claims, the court is given discretion over the
disbursement of remaining sums for some public purpose beneficial to the class injured.
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discussed below, may provide both substantial deterrence and meaning-
ful compensation. Such compensation might be in the form of reduced
prices in the relevant commodity, lower taxes, or contribution to some
general public purpose. In any case, reducing deterrence by curtailing
private plaintiff actions because compensation is imperfect has little to
recommend it either as good policy or good sense. Until alternative
means which are superior to the section 4 action are suggested to max-
imize both deterrence and compensation, calls for the repeal of the treble
damage provision are premature.
V. PASSING-ON REVISITED
In a recent case, Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 72 the Supreme Court
cast a serious impediment in the path of the consumer seeking to redress
injury caused by an antitrust violation. By a six to three majority, the
Court held that indirect purchasers are precluded from seeking damages
despite proof that an illegal overcharge was passed on to them. 73 The
Court, speaking through Justice White, based its decision on the ruling in
Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Machinery Corp.,174 in which it had
held that the defendant could not escape liability for antitrust violations
on the theory that plaintiff had passed on any increasedcost to consum-
ers.175 The Hanover Shoe decision was ostensibly based on two con-
siderations: (1) the increased complexity caused by attempts to prove
passing-on through extended chains of distribution, 176 and (2) the likeli-
hood that few remote purchasers would sue because of the small size of
their individual injuries. The result would be that violators "would retain
the fruits of their illegality" and the effectiveness of treble damage
actions would be substantially diminished. 177
Justice White, writing for the majority in Illinois Brick, 78 initially
disposed of arguments for unequal application of the passing-on theory
The committee considered and squarely rejected arguments that this method of
applying damage recoveries . . . is unconstitutional. Once it is acknowledged
that the antitrust violator has no constitutional right to retain the profits of his
illegal activity, it becomes clear that he has no constitutionally protected interest
in how those profits are distributed for the benefit of those whom he has injured.
• . . The only alternative-retention of the profits by the adjudicated wrong-
doer-is unconscionable and unacceptable. (citations omitted)
H.R. No. 499, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 16, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
2572, 2586.
172. 431 U.S. 720 (1977).
173. Id. at 736.
174. 392 U.S. 481 (1968).
175. Id. at 494.
176. Id. at 492-93.
177. Id. at 494.
178. Justice White also wrote the majority opinion in Hanover Shoe.
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on the ground that permitting offensive but not defensive use would
expose defendants to multiple liability. He further indicated that because
the principal rationale of Hanover Shoe was the increased complexity
inherent in proving passing-on, that case provided no justification for its
differential application.' 79 After turning aside arguments for unequal
application, Justice White addressed the suggestion that Hanover Shoe
be limited or overturned.180 This suggestion was declined for two rea-
sons,' 81 namely, the threat of increased complexity presented by permit-
ting proof of passing-on in multiparty actions 8 2 and the reduced effec-
tiveness of treble damage actions which would allegedly be caused by
permitting more than one plaintiff to sue.
83
Justice Brennan, dissenting, argued that the majority decision was
contrary to the actual rationale of Hanover Shoe,'8 4 the congressional
purpose in passing section 4 of the Clayton Act, 185 and Title III of the
Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976.186 The primary basis for the Hano-
ver Shoe decision, according to Justice Brennan, was a concern for the
effectiveness of the antitrust laws and the fear that, by pleading passing-
on, a defendant would be permitted to keep its ill-gotten gains.187 Conse-
quently, he concluded that that case did not stand for the proposition that
passing-on may never be introduced into a section 4 action, but for the
more limited rule that a defendant may not frustrate the antitrust laws by
asserting it defensively. Because the middleman's incentive to pass on
overcharges is great and his incentive to jeopardize business by suing his
supplier is small, the Court's decision is actually contrary to the policy of
encouraging enforcement of the antitrust laws.'
The dissenters' view was given credence by Congress' passage of the
Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976.189 Title III of the Act permits a
state to maintain a section 4 action on behalf of its residents who have
been injured by a violation of the antitrust laws. Congress' concern for
the ultimate consumer is evident in this legislation. As Justice Brennan
179. Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 729-35.
180. Id. at 736-47.
181. In addition, the Court relied upon stare decisis. Id. at 736-37.
182. Id. at 737-45.
183. Id. at 745-47.
184. Id. at 750-54 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
185. Id. at 749, 754-56.
186. Id. at 749, 756-58.
187. Id. at 751-52 (citing Hanover Shoe Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 392 U.S.
481, 492-94 (1968)). But see Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. at 731-35.
188. Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. at 764-65 & nn. 23 & 24 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
189. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970), as amended by Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, Pub.
L. No. 94-435 §§ 301-304, 90 Stat. 1396.
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wrote, "[I]t is clear the new Act is intended to provide a remedy for
injured consumers whether or not they purchased directly from the
violator."19°
The dissent also demonstrated that the prospect of multiple liability,
relied on by the majority as the linchpin of their decision, is not as
ominous as the majority suggests. The four-year statute of limitations,
res judicata and collateral estoppel, procedures for joinder, consolida-
tion, interpleader, and the transfer of complex actions to a single federal
district, render the prospect of multiple recoveries extremely remote.1 91
Finally, implicit in the majority's argument is the untenable proposition
that the administrative inconvenience of fashioning additional procedu-
ral mechanisms to prevent unfair duplicative recovery outweighs the
rights of victims to be made whole by the party who has injured them. 192
Given the combined policies of deterrence and compensation underlying
section 4, a better argument can be made for risking multiple liability in
the odd case than for creating an irrebutable presumption that a plaintiff,
other than a direct purchaser, can never meet the burden of proving that
he was injured. In response to the argument advanced by the majority
that permitting the offensive use of the passing-on theory would result in
an unacceptable level of complexity, Justice Brennan pointed out that
most antitrust cases are, by nature, extremely complicated proceed-
ings. 193
If there were no alternative to overturning Hanover Shoe in order to
permit recovery by the real victims of many antitrust violations, it is
clear that the antitrust laws and the congressional policy which they
reflect require nothing less. The argument that by denying the use of the
passing-on theory judicial economy is accomplished is not compelling.
What recommends the Hanover Shoe decision is that it increases the
190. Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 756-57 (1977).
191. Id. at 761-64. See also McGuire, The Passing-On Defense and the Right of
Remote Purchasers to Recover Treble Damages Under Hanover Shoe, 33 U. PITT. L. REV.
177, 197-202 (1971); Comment, Standing To Sue In Antitrust Cases: The Offensive Use of
Passing On, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 976, 993-98 (1975).
192. Justice White wrote, "The apportionment of the recovery throughout the distribu-
tion chain would increase the overall costs of recovery by injecting extremely complex
issues into the case; at the same time such an apportionment would reduce the benefits to
each plaintiff by dividing the potential recovery among a much larger group." Illinois
Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 745 (1977). This reasoning is, of course, fantastic. First
of all, an apportionment would increase the benefits to everyone except the direct
purchaser, since under the Court's decision only the latter can recover at all. Secondly, it
is arguable that some increase in the cost of litigation is not too high a price to pay for
putting the damages in the injured party's pocket rather than providing an uninjured party
with a windfall.
193. Id. at 758 & n.14. See generally Lanzillotti, supra note 70, at 330-32; Pollock,
The "Injury" and "Causation" Elements of a Treble-Damage Antitrust Action, 57 Nw.
U.L. REV. 691, 695 (1963).
[Vol. 27:81
Antitrust and the Consumer Interest
deterrent effect of the antitrust statutes by making treble damage liability
more likely to arise from their violation. 194
Class and parens patriae actions hold the potential for widespread
recovery by ultimate consumers. Under the circumstances, the Illinois
Brick decision can only be regarded as obstructionist judicial legislation.
By passing the Antitrust Improvements Act, Congress has indicated that
it believes the consumer should have a remedy. In the words of Justice
Brennan, "It is difficult to see how Congress could have expressed itself
more clearly."' 9 5 Justice Brennan's concluding paragraph succinctly
states the extent of the damage done by the Illinois Brick decision:
The Court today regrettably weakens the effectiveness of the
private treble-damage action as a deterrent to antitrust viola-
tions by, in most cases, precluding consumers from recovering
for antitrust injuries. For in many instances, consumers, al-
though indirect purchasers, bear the brunt of antitrust viola-
tions. To deny them an opportunity for recovery is particularly
indefensible when direct purchasers, acting as middlemen, and
ordinarily reluctant to sue their suppliers pass on the bulk of
their increased costs to consumers farther along the chain of
distribution. Congress has given us a clear signal that § 4 is not
to be read to have the restrictive scope ascribed to it by the
Court today.'%
Unfortunately, as Justice Blackmun wrote in his Illinois Brick dissent,
we must look to congressional action to undo the harm done by the
"wooden" approach of the majority.197
VI. PARENS PATRIAE ACTIONS
The parens patriae concept derives from the early common law. 98 The
Crown was understood to have retained from feudal times the authority
to act as guardian of subjects incapable of protecting their own interests
such as infants and the insane. In the United States, the concept of
parens patriae, passed from the Crown to the individual states, has
undergone a process of extension. 199 A series of cases has established the
194. See Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 753 (1977) (Brennan, J., dis-
senting).
195. Id. at 758. See also id. at 764 n.23.
196. Id. at 764-65 (footnotes omitted).
197. Id. at 766 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
198. See generally Malina & Blechman, Parens Patriae Suits for Treble Damages Under
the Antitrust Laws, 65 Nw. U.L. REV. 193 (1970); Note, State Protection of Its Economy
and Environment: Parens Patriae Suits for Damages, 6 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROB. 411
(1970).
199. Originally the royal prerogative permitted the Crown to act as the guardian of
subjects under a legal disability, such as infancy or insanity, and as superintendent of
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right of the states to sue in a parens patriae capacity to vindicate quasi-
sovereign interests. 2°° Because the interest protected must be quasi-
sovereign, states are prevented from asserting the legal rights of particu-
lar individuals legally capable of maintaining an action themselves. Con-
sequently, the state must allege injury to itself and to its citizens general-
ly, making clear that "[the state] has an interest apart from that of
particular individuals who may be affected." 20 1
In Georgia v. Pennsylvania Railroad,2 2 the Supreme Court affirmed
the right of the state to bring an action to enjoin railroads from dis-
criminating against Georgian shippers in freight rates. Although Georgia
sought damages as well as injunctive relief, the Court disposed of the
damage issue in favor of the railroad on the ground that the rates
charged by the railroads had been approved by the Interstate Commerce
Commission and an award of damages would consequently constitute an
illegal rebate.20 ' The plain implication of the language and logic of Geor-
gia is that, absent the Interstate Commerce Commission's primary juris-
diction, the Court would not have dismissed the state's prayer for dam-
ages. The Court thus implicitly recognized the principle that damages are
an appropriate remedy in parens patriae actions. 2°4 Twenty-seven years
after Georgia, the Court held, in Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co. ,2"5 that the
"charitable uses." In the United States, the states began to assert, and the Supreme Court
to exercise jurisdiction over, claims involving quasi-sovereign considerations such as
boundaries and other matters affecting the general welfare of their citizens. Cases in
which states were held to have parens patriae standing to protect such quasi-sovereign
interests included Louisiana v. Texas, 176 U.S. 1 (1899), which involved a dispute over
Texas' use of the quarantine to exclude from its ports good shipped out of New Orleans;
Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230 (1907), in which Georgia sought to enjoin
a factory in Tennessee from releasing sulphurous acid gas which soon made its way into
Georgia; and Georgia v. Pennsylvania R.R., 324 U.S. 439 (1945), in which the state sought
damages and injunctive relief for alleged price-fixing by the railroads which discriminated
against Georgian shippers. Cases in which parens standing was denied include New
Hampshire v. Louisiana, 108 U.S. 76 (1883) (consolidated with New York v. Lousiana), in
which the Court invalidated state statutes which gave state officials the power to act as
assignees of the causes of action of citizens; Oklahoma v. Atchison, Topeka & Sante Fe
R.R., 220 U.S. 277 (1911), involving alleged discriminatory rates charged to shippers of
the state; and Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251 (1972), in which the state sought
damages on behalf of its citizens for injury to the general economy of the state.
200. See cases cited in note 199 supra.
201. Georgia v. Pennsylvania R.R., 324 U.S. 439, 451 (1945).
202. 324 U.S. 439 (1945).
203. Id. at 452-53. Contra, Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 260 (1972) (Court
concluded that Georgia had left the issue of damages open).
204. See Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. at 271-73 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
205. 405 U.S. 251 (1972) (39 states submitted amici briefs supporting Hawaii).
[Vol. 27:81
Antitrust and the Consumer Interest
state could not seek treble damages as parens patriae for injury to its
economy caused by antitrust violations in the distribution of petroleum
products. The majority in Hawaii reasoned that injury to the state's
economy was "no more than a reflection of injuries to the 'business or
property' of consumers, for which they may recover themselves under
section 4. 26 In response to the state's argument that individual consum-
ers are impotent to redress individually small antitrust injuries, the
majority directed consumers to the class action.2 7 If injuries such as that
pleaded by Hawaii were to be afforded redress under section 4, the
majority stated, "we should insist upon a clear expression of a congres-
sional purpose." 2"
A similar question, whether a state can sue as parens patriae for
injuries to its citizens' business or property, was addressed by the Ninth
Circuit in California v. Frito-Lay, Inc.2" The state argued that the
practical inability of individual consumers to obtain redress for antitrust
violations created a situation analogous to the parens patriae role of
guardian for those with legal disabilities. Although the court praised the
state's attempt to find a solution to the problem of consumers' antitrust
remedies, it held that the common law concept of parens patriae pro-
vided no authority for an action such as the state contemplated. The
court was also reluctant to usurp the legislative prerogative.
It was in the aftermath of the Frito-Lay decision that Congress passed
the Antitrust Improvements Act. 210 Title III of the Act authorizes state
attorneys general to "bring a civil action in the name of such State, as
parens patriae on behalf of natural persons residing in such State" who
have been injured by violations of the Sherman Act. 211 Amounts allo-
cable to business or to persons exercising the option of being excluded
are not included in the recovery. 21 2 The state is entitled to recover treble
the amount of damages sustained by persons properly included in such
an action, costs, and a reasonable attorney's fee. 2 3 The attorney general
of the state is required to give notice of the action by publication unless
206. Id. at 264.
207. This advice is curious in light of the subsequent Eisen and Illinois Brick decisions
limiting the utility of the class action to consumers.
208. 405 U.S. at 264.
209. 474 F.2d 774 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 908 (1973).
210. Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-435, 90 Stat. 1383 (amending
15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976)). For the legislative history of the Act, see H.R. REP. No. 499,94th
Cong., 2d Sess. 5, 8, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2572, 2574-75,
2577-78.
211. 15 U.S.C. § 15(c)(a)(1) (1970).
212. Id.
213. Id. at § 15(c)(a)(2).
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the court determines that due process requires additional notice.2" 4 The
notice must inform recipients that they can be excluded by seasonably
advising the court of their desire for exclusion. 215 With the exception of
persons and businesses excluded from the action, a final judgment is res
judicata with respect to any section 4 claim.2 16 Dismissal or compromise
of an action brought under the Act requires the approval of the court and
such notice as the court directs. 21 7 An unusual provision of the Act,
designed to assuage fears of nuisance suits by state officials with ulterior
motives, is the award of attorney's fees to the defendant if the court
finds that the "State attorney general has acted in bad faith, vexatiously,
wantonly, or for oppressive reasons." 218
In an effort to avoid the need to prove the amount of damages to each
individual, the Act permits the computation of damages "in the aggre-
gate by statistical or sampling methods, by the computation of illegal
over-charges, or by such other reasonable system of estimating aggregate
damages as the court in its discretion may permit.1 2'9 Damages re-
covered may be distributed according to the court's direction or be
treated as a civil penalty "deposited with the State as general reve-
nues." 220 In either event, a person on whose behalf the suit was brought
must be afforded a reasonable opportunity "to secure his appropriate
portion of the net monetary relief. ",221 Finally, the Act directs the Attor-
ney General of the United States to notify the attorney general of any
state having an interest, of any antitrust actions brought by the Justice
Department, and to make the Department's investigative files available
for use in parens patriae actions. 222
Since its enactment on September 30, 1976, only four actions brought
under Title III have been reported by the Antitrust & Trade Regulation
Report.223 The nature of these few cases, while certainly not conclu-
sive evidence, fails to support the fears of opponents of the legislation.
Congressional opponents predicted that Title III would be used by polit-
ically ambitious state attorneys general to elevate themselves in the eyes
of the public by goring business' ox. Other critics opposed the bill on
the ground that problems involved would outweigh the benefit to con-
214. Id. at § 15(c)(b)(1).
215. Id. at § 15(c)(b)(2).
216. Id. at § 15(c)(b)(3).
217. Id. at § 15(c)(c).
218. Id. at § 15(c)(d)(2).
219. Id. at § 15(d).
220. Id. at § 15(e).
221. Id.
222. Id. at § 15(f).
223. See note 229 infra.
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sumers.224 Although substantial difficulties remain, for example, in
showing that an overcharge was passed on to consumers unaffected by
intervening transactions and various market pressures, these difficulties
(and the fact that many antitrust violations affect the consumer only
indirectly, for instance, through inflation) which inevitably limit the
benefits flowing to the consuming public from the Act, do not negate
such benefits as might result despite them.
Unfortunately, the Act may turn out to have been the victim of judicial
infanticide. By establishing a conclusive presumption against the ability
of anyone but the direct purchaser to prove damages, the Illinois Brick
decision renders the Act significantly less valuable than it otherwise
would have been. Congressional efforts to legislatively overrule Illinois
Brick are underway.225 Senator Edward Kennedy and Representative
Peter Rodino have introduced bills to amend the Clayton Act so as to
make even clearer Congress' intention to extend the relief granted by
section 4 to indirect, as well as direct, consumers.226 As currently draft-
ed, the proposed legislation would also overrule Hanover Shoe, 27 thus
permitting defendants to assert that a plaintiff was not injured because
224. See H.R. REP. No. 94-4994 (pt. 1), 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 24-25 (minority view
of Messrs. Hutchinson, Railsback, Wiggins, Moorhead, Ashbrook, Hyde, and Kindness).
For a detailed discussion of the Act and some of the anticipated problems with it, see
Handler & Blechman, Antitrust and the Consumer Interest: The Fallacy of Parens Patriae
and A Suggested New Approach, 85 YALE L.J. 626 (1976). The authors argue that few
antitrust violations provide consumers with compensable injuries, that the parens patriae
act fails to deal with the problems of conflicts of interest among class members and
adequate representation for absent parties, that constitutional problems arise from the
taking of defendants' property without due process, and that by authorizing state officials
to enforce federal antitrust laws the Act runs afoul of the appointments clause of the
Constitution, U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
The Act's inability to remedy every single injury consumers receive because of antitrust
violations should not be a crucial defect. Moreover, the "opt out" provision of the Act
should obviate any conflict of interest problems, and the discretion given the court over
distribution is likely to ease conflicting claims regarding amounts of damages owing
particular individuals. State attorneys general are likely to provide adequate representa-
tion, and consumers who wish may exclude themselves and seek representation privately.
Furthermore, the House Judiciary Committee determined that a defendant who has been
adjudicated liable has no constitutionally protected interest in the manner of distribution
of the damages. See note 171 supra. Finally, the appointments clause concerns separation
of executive and legislative powers and is inapposite to the capacity of states to sue as
parens patriae.
225. See 823 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) A-3 (July 21, 1977).
226. The two bills, S. 1874, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. (1977) and H.R. 8359, 95th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1977) are identical. They would amend § 4 of the Clayton Act by adding the words
"in fact, directly or indirectly" after the word "injured." Comparable changes are made
in other sections of the Act.
227. Because the proposed legislation will, if passed, cause the words "in fact" to be
inserted, a defendant will presumably be able to contend that because a plaintiff passed on
an overcharge, that plaintiff was not injured in fact.
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the overcharge was passed on. Although this legislation has received
widespread support from officials charged with enforcement of antitrust
laws,228 its passage is problematic.
An examination of actions brought under the parens patriae Act prior
to the Illinois Brick decision is interesting in what it discloses about the
type of injury involved and the relationship of the defendants to the
consumers on whose behalf the suits have been brought. The attorneys
general of three states have brought four parens actions which have been
reported in the Antitrust & Trade Regulation Report.229
In Colorado v. Valley Petroleum Co. ,230 the attorney general of Col-
orado obtained indictments against five petroleum distributors for al-
legedly violating state antitrust laws and instituted a parens patriae
action against the five and two additional defendants alleging violations
of the Sherman Act. The action alleged that the companies conspired to
raise and maintain an artificial price for more than 500,000 gallons of
gasoline sold between December 1975 and April 1977. The state sought
injunctive relief and treble damages in an amount to be determined after
discovery but estimated to be several hundred thousand dollars, plus
attorney's fees and costs. Six of the defendants have agreed to a settle-
ment involving payment of $128,404 in damages which will be placed
in an interest-bearing "Colorado Antitrust Gasoline Fund," pending
distribution.23' The defendants also agreed to a plan prohibiting most
communication between competitors regarding retail price.
228. See, e.g., letter from the Federal Trade Commission to Senator Edward M.
Kennedy (July 15, 1977), reported in 823 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) A-12(July 21, 1977); testimony of John H. Shenefield, Acting Assistant Attorney General For
Antitrust, before the Senate Antitrust Subcomm. (July 21, 1977) reported in the Wash.
Post, July 22, 1977, § D, at 6, col. 2 (Mr. Shenefield testified that the Justice Department
strongly supports the proposed legislation to overrule the Illinois Brick decision); tes-
timony of Chauncey H. Browning, Chairman of the Antitrust Comm. of the Nat'l Assoc.,
of Attorneys General before the Senate Antitrust Subcomm. (July 21, 1977) reprinted in
part in 824 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) A-12 (July 28, 1977) (Mr. Browning
testified that the bill enjoyed the nearly unanimous support of state attorneys general from
every region of the country). Contra, testimony of Earl E. Pollock before the Senate
Antitrust Subcomm., reported in 824 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) A-12 (July
28, 1977) (Mr. Pollock expressed misgivings about the effect of the proposed legislation on
the problems of multiple liability and manageability).
229. Colorado v. Valley Petroleum Co., No. 77-352 (D. Colo., filed Apr. 12, 1977),
reported in 810 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) D-1 (Apr. 21, 1977); Maryland v.
Jack Foley Realty, Inc., No. 77-618. (D. Md., filed Apr. 22, 1977), reported in 811
ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) D-3 (Apr. 28, 1977); Colorado v. Bang & Olufsen
of America, Inc., No. 77-528 (D. Colo., filed June 2, 1977), reported in 817 ANTITRUST &
TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) D-I (June 9, 1977); Ohio v. Klosterman's French Baking Co.,
No. C-1-75-338 (S.D. Ohio, filed May 23, 1977), reported in 819 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG.
REP. (BNA) D-1 (June 23, 1977).
230. 809 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) D-l, Apr. 14, 1977.
231. 829 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) D-1, Sept. 1, 1977.
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In Maryland v. Jack Foley Realty, Inc. ,232 the state is seeking treble
the amount of an alleged overcharge on real estate commissions which is
also the subject of a federal criminal action in which six defendants have
been found guilty. 233 The defendant realtors are charged with conspiring
to fix commission rates in Montgomery County, a suburb of Washington,
D.C. The state has requested court instructions respecting distribution of
the damages which it hopes to recover. The state is also seeking injunc-
tive relief, costs, and attorney's fees.
The attorney general of Colorado, in the second parens action on
behalf of consumers living in that state, has brought a parens suit,
Colorado v. Bang & Olufsen of America, Inc.,234 against importers and
distributors of phonographic equipment. The suit alleges a conspiracy to
fix prices in stereophonic products through coercive distribution prac-
tices. In addition to injunctive relief, the state is seeking damages equal-
ing the difference between fair market and manipulated prices for the
affected products.
In Ohio v. Klosterman's French Baking Co.,235 the state was joined by
the school system of Cincinnati in charging three bakeries with a conspir-
acy to submit fixed bids to various school systems in Ohio. The action
was settled and three separate consent decrees entered. Under the terms
of the settlement, the state and the school system will divide a $65,000
recovery. The plaintiffs had sought injunctive relief, recovery of a $50
per diem civil penalty provided by state law, plus treble damages for
Sherman Act violations, double damages for violations of state laws,
costs, and attorney's fees.
These four cases and the fact that many more have not been reported
indicate that public officials are approaching the parens patriae act with
caution. While it is reassuring to have restrained testing of the waters, it
is hoped that after an initial period the states will engage in vigorous
prosecution of antitrust violators under the Act. The Illinois Brick deci-
sion has temporarily impeded any large scale enforcement effort by
limiting the Act's effect to cases in which only one transaction has
occurred. As the four cases considered here indicate, however, signifi-
cant enforcement activity should be possible even within the confines of
Illinois Brick. Both the Maryland real estate and the Ohio baking com-
pany cases appear to involve the type of direct purchases required by
232. 811 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) D-1, Apr. 28, 1977.
233. No. 77-0185 (D. Md., filed Sept. 28, 1977), reported in Wash. Post, Oct. 29, 1977
§ C, at 1.
234. 817 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) D-1, June 9, 1977.
235. 819 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) D-1, June 23, 1977.
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Illinois Brick. Valley Petroleum may very well also involve direct pur-
chases depending on the arrangements between the distributors and
retailers. Bang & Olufsen demonstrates the unfortunate potential of the
Illinois Brick decision. Despite a chain of distribution apparently involv-
ing only three levels, consumers, such as the purchasers of stereophonic
equipment in Bang & Olufsen, are precluded from recovery.
Nevertheless, it appears that antitrust violations are occurring in
which individual consumers are injured as direct purchasers. Even if,
because of Illinois Brick, the parens act accomplishes no more than
redressing a significant number of injuries of this type, passage of the bill
will not have been a wasted effort. Whether and to what extent the
courts will be receptive to parens actions remains to be seen. The
Supreme Court has already, according to some observers, flouted the
plain intent of Congress. If congressional efforts to overrule the Illinois
Brick decision legislatively are successful, Congress' intent to provide a
meaningful remedy for individuals damaged by violations of the antitrust
laws should be clear even to the Illinois Brick majority. Such legislation
is also certain to encourage state officials to utilize the Act.
The courts have displayed increasing reluctance to permit actions
which aggregate the claims of large numbers of consumers. Whether the
problems which have limited the effectiveness of the class action will
beset the parens patriae action depends on the care with which the
actions are brought and the attitude of the judiciary. To the extent that
judicial reticence to entertain parens actions improves their quality and
effectiveness, it may serve a valuable function. However, to the extent
that the courts deny a congressionally mandated remedy to the individual
consumer who can prove injury because of a feelihg that individual
injuries are inconsequential, they will be guilty of a disservice to the
consumer, the nation's economic health, and the law.
CONCLUSION
If the policy of the antitrust laws in general and, specifically, section 4
of the Clayton Act is deterrence of potential violators coupled with
compensation of victims, that enforcement mechanism which guarantees
a maximum of both should be pursued. Unfortunately, the conclusion is
inescapable that the Supreme Court has undertaken a course diametrical-
ly opposed to the policy suggested here. While paying lip service to the
ideal of compensating innocent consumers injured in their pocketbooks
by the unscrupulous, avaricious, and illegal practices of large and small
businessmen, the Court based its decision on a thinly veiled sympathy for
the antitrust defendant. To be sure, constitutional principles require that
a defendant's right not be violated. However, there is no constitutional
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requirement that the Court place prohibitive burdens on the very classes
which rule 23 was designed to benefit, as it did in Eisen. Neither should
the Court, in the words of former Senator Hugh Scott, "flout the will and
purpose of Congress in a most crass fashion," 236 as it did in Illinois Brick
by gutting the parens patriae bill and signaling to business that antitrust
violations are not taken seriously by the highest court of the land. As
Justice Brennan observed in his dissent from that decision, similar judi-
cial obstinacy led to the passage of the Clayton Act in 1914.237 It is a sad
commentary on the present Court that its erosion of the few tools
available for the realization of the purpose of the Act has again made
remedial legislation necessary. Equally disheartening is Congress' appa-
rent lack of independence from the business lobby, as evidenced by the
fact that remedial legislation appears unlikely in the near future.
The Clayton Act was not the result, however, of congressional for-
titude, but of vocal public outrage at reprehensible business practices. It
remains to be seen whether the public will once more see through the
self-serving and alarmist entreaties of the business lobby and pressure
Congress into overturning the Illinois Brick decision by passing addition-
al legislation making clear that the policies of the Clayton Act are still the
policies endorsed by the Congress of the United States.
Philip Fairbanks
236. Testimony of former Senator Hugh Scott before the Senate Antitrust Subcomm.
(July 21, 1977), reprinted in 824 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) A-13 (July 28,
1977). Mr. Scott also stated that the Court had engaged in "at best, a disingenuous bit of
legalistic sophistry and, at worst, a rather high-handed exercise in judicial legislation,
while soaking consumers with the impact of their constitutional 'last best guess.' " Id.
237. Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 758 (1977) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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